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BOOK REVIEW 
Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, 
and Using New Evidence. By Wilfred J. Ritz. 
Edited by Wythe Holt and L.H. LaRue. Norman, 
Oklahoma, and London, England: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1990. 264 pages. 
Reviewed by ROGER J. MINER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 102nd Congress of the United States is in its second 
session as this book review is written. The problems it faces, 
difficult as they are, pale into insignificance when compared 
with the tasks that confronted the first Congress when it 
convened in 1789 under the newly-ratified constitution. Although 
the Constitution contained the broad outlines of a new national 
government, the members of the first Congress were constrained to 
draw a more detailed blueprint for governance. That they were 
able to do so in one session is a tribute to their sweeping 
visions o.f the future as well as to their political abilities. 
Their consensus-forging skills are worthy of study by modern-day 
lawmakers, who often seem incapable of compromise. 1 There is 
much else to be learned from an examination of the work of the 
first Congress, which set the stage for a new government of the 
United states by fleshing out the constitution in the course of 
adopting twenty-seven separate Acts and four Resolutions. 2 
One of the most enduring of the twenty-seven Acts adopted by 
the first Congress was the one entitled "An Act to Establish the 
Judicial Courts of the United states. 113 Frequently referred to 
as the Judiciary Act of 1789, or the First Judiciary Act, this 
item of legislation established a three-level system of national 
courts that has continued, with various jurisdictional and 
functional alterations at each level, to the present day. 4 
Exercising the power granted to it under the Constitution to 
establish courts "inferior" to the Supreme Court, the first 
Congress in the First Judiciary Act established both District and 
Circuit Courts. 5 No judges were authorized for the Circuit 
Courts, which were to be composed of two Supreme court Justices 
"riding circuit" plus a District Judge. 6 For district court 
purposes, the nation was divided into thirteen districts, with at 
least one district in each state. 7 one judge was provided for 
each district court. 8 For circuit court purposes, three circuits 
were established, each consisting of two or more districts. 9 
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, both the district and 
circuit courts were courts of original jurisdiction, and the 
circuit courts had certain appellate jurisdiction as well. 
Conferred upon the district courts was (1) exclusive jurisdiction 
over maritime and admiralty causes, including seizures on the 
high seas (saving to suitors available common law remedies); (2) 
exclusive jurisdiction over all seizures on land and of all suits 
for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the 
United States; (3) jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of 
the several states and the circuit courts, "of all causes where 
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States;" (4) jurisdiction concurrent 
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with the state and circuit courts in suits at common law brought 
by the United states "and the matter in dispute amounts, 
exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars;" 
and (5) exclusive jurisdiction of suits against consuls or vice-
consuls, except for criminal offenses triable in the circuit 
courts. 10 
The district courts were given exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction respecting "crimes and offences that shall be 
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed 
within their respective districts, or upon the high seas; where 
no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, 
a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted. 1111 
The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of the same 
crimes and offenses and exclusive jurisdiction over all others. 12 
On the civil side, the Act accorded to the circuit courts 
"original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several 
States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in 
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, 
the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States 
are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the 
suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, 
and a citizen of another State. " 13 
The Act provided for removal of cases from state courts to 
the circuit courts in private civil litigation where the amount 
in dispute exceeded $500 and the petition for removal was filed 
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by a defendant who was an alien; a defendant sued in a state 
different from his state of citizenship by a plaintiff who was a 
citizen of the state where suit was brought; and by either party 
to a dispute over a land title where one party claimed title 
under a grant from the state where the action was brought, the 
other party claimed title under a grant from another state, and 
the matter in dispute exceeded $500. 14 The circuit courts had 
appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of the district court 
in admiralty and maritime cases where the amount in dispute 
exceeded three hundred dollars, and over final judgments of the 
district court where the amount in dispute exceeded fifty 
dollars. 15 No right of appeal from any criminal conviction was 
afforded in the federal court system until 1889, when the right 
of direct review by the Supreme Court was provided for capital 
cases. 16 The First Judiciary Act also failed to confer general 
federal question jurisdiction upon the lower courts, a deficiency 
that was not finally remedied until 1875. 17 
Conferred upon the Supreme Court, in language tracking the 
Constitution, was exclusive jurisdiction over civil controversies 
where a state was a party, except between a state and its 
citizens; original jurisdiction in suits against ambassadors or 
other public ministers, consistent with the law of nations: and 
original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits brought by 
ambassadors, or other public ministers. 18 Original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction was provided in actions between a state 
and citizens of other states or aliens. 19 Manifesting the 
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importance of jury trials to the American citizenry, the Act 
provided that "the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme court, 
in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, 
shall be by jury • .,zo Final judgments and decrees of the circuit 
courts in civil cases were appealable to the Supreme Court on 
writs of error if the matter in dispute exceeded $2,000 in 
value. 21 Review of a final judgment of the highest court of a 
state was allowed where the question involved the validity of a 
treaty or of a statute of the United States or of an authority 
exercised under the United States. 22 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 is more than just an object of 
historical interest. It is an important point of reference for 
those who are concerned with the present-day operation of the 
federal court system and care about its future. At a time when 
structural reform of the system is under serious consideration,n 
the institutional antecedents of the existing structure are 
worthy of examination. Also of interest to those who would 
prepare for the future of the federal courts is the original 
treatment of subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity 
jurisdiction. 24 It should be remembered that the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 did not vest in the federal courts the full judicial 
power provided by the Constitution, probably because the 
Federalists in control of Congress sought to appease the Anti-
Federalists.25 Indeed, Congress never has conferred upon the 
courts the full constitutional judicial power it has been 
authorized to confer. 26 Should it do so now, in response to 
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popular demand? Or should it cut back? Should the status quo be 
maintained? The answers to these questions, and others, can be 
informed by a study of the original Judiciary Act. one thing is 
certain: the ever-expanding menu provided in the lower federal 
courts, a consequence of the "underdeveloped capacity [of 
Congress) for self-restraint, 1127 is beginning to create a 
caseload crisis of major proportions.~ 
Twentieth century scholars, lawyers and judges have had 
occasion to refer to section 34 of the original Judiciary Act 
and, apparently, will have reason to do so again. In section 34, 
Congress went beyond the structural, jurisdictional and 
procedural aspects of the newly created judicial system and 
ventured into the area of the law to be applied by the federal 
courts. Section 34, which has survived in the statutes 
essentially in its original form, provided: 
That the laws of the several states, except where the 
constitution, treaties or statutes of the united states 
shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded 
as rules of decision in trials at common law in the 
courts of the United States in cases where they 
apply. 29 
It has been said that "[p)robably no statute regarding the 
federal courts has led to such difficulty" as this one. 30 
According to present conventional wisdom, section 34 
requires that state law, whether statutory or common, must be 
applied except in matters governed by the federal constitution, 
Acts of Congress or treaties duly ratified. This notion of 
course gained currency when Swift v. Tyson, interpreting laws in 
the section 34 context as statutory only, 31 was overruled by Erie 
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R.R. v. Tompkins, in which Justice Brandeis wrote: "whether the 
law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a 
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of 
federal concern. 1132 The Brandeis opinion was based in part on 
what the Justice referred to as "recent research of a competent 
scholar."33 The scholar was Professor Charles Warren, who had 
found in the attic of the Senate what appeared to be the original 
manuscript draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In the draft that 
Professor Warren found, there was a provision establishing as 
rules of decision at common law in courts of the United states, 
except where the federal constitution, federal statutes or 
treaties applied, "the statute law of the several States in force 
for the time being and their unwritten or common law now in use, 
whether by adoption from the common law of England, the ancient 
statutes of the same or otherwise. 1134 Warren thought that the 
final version of section 34 was intended to say the same thing as 
the newly discovered draft. He believed that section 34 was 
grounded in federalism concerns. 
In their fascinating examination of the First Judiciary Act, 
the authors of Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
put an entirely new spin on section 34. They say that it is not 
about federalism at all, admonishing the reader that "one ought 
not to read Section 34 as doing what to moderns it seems 
perfectly obvious that it does and should do, that is, to 
instruct national judges to look at state statutes and state 
decisions and follow their lead. 1135 The authors note that at the 
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time the Judiciary Act was adopted there were no common law 
decisions in print and the state statutes were not generally 
collected and printed. It therefore would make no sense for 
section 34 to refer to these as sources of law. Moreover, a 
persuasive argument is made that the manuscript discovered by 
Professor Warren was not the same version of the bill used by the 
Senate during its deliberations. The Warren view is said to be 
flawed by reliance on the manuscript. 
Through scholarly deduction, examination of ancient 
documents, legal reasoning, attention to the language then in use 
and an astute understanding of the tenor of the times, the 
distinguished legal historians who wrote this book have posited 
two alternative conclusions about section 34: that it was 
intended as a direction to the new courts to apply American 
rather than British law in all common law civil and criminal 
proceedings; or "most probably (that it] was intended as a 
temporary measure to provide an applicable American law for 
national criminal prosecutions, should national criminal 
prosecutions be brought in the national courts, pending the time 
that Congress would provide by statute for the definition and 
punishment of national crimes. 1136 They are certain that section 
34 was not intended to apply to diversity cases and that "on its 
historical basis, Erie is dead wrong. 1137 
Rewriting the History makes a forceful argument for the 
proposition that section 34 was designed to allow the national 
courts to apply American, rather than British, criminal common 
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law until a national criminal code could be adopted. The first 
session of the First Congress failed to pass a criminal bill, 
although it did define two crimes with punishment, both contained 
in the Collection Act and relating to the collection of duties,~ 
and one crime with no specified penalty relating to the 
registering of ships and contained in the Coasting Act.~ The 
Crimes Act of 1790, adopted at the second session of the First 
Congress, was the earliest criminal code. It defined crimes and 
provided penalties for four categories of prohibited activities 
within the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the United States: 
felonies committed on the high seas, offenses directly affecting 
the operations of government, crimes committed within federal 
enclaves, and interference with the functioning of the federal 
courts.~ The offenses sanctioned in the Crimes Act were either 
mentioned specifically in the Constitution or established under 
the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 41 
At least between the first and second sessions of the First 
Congress, then, there was no criminal code in effect. Even the 
Crimes Act of 1790 can hardly be characterized as a comprehensive 
criminal code. What criminal law was to apply? It generally was 
assumed that some law of crimes was to be applied, else why grant 
to the lower federal courts such complete criminal jurisdiction? 
Even the Anti-Federalists arguing for a Bill of Rights that 
included guarantees relating to the criminal process "premised 
their argument on the assumption that the national courts unde~ 
the Constitution did have a comprehensive criminal 
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jurisdiction. 1142 Another historical curiosity supporting the 
contention of the authors is that the first federal judges, in 
giving their grand jury charges, seem to have accepted the 
extension of criminal jurisdiction to non-statutory crimes.~ 
CUrious also is the position of section 34 in the First Judiciary 
Act. It is the next to last section, just before the provision 
for u.s. Attorneys in each district and for an Attorney General 
of the United States. Does the position signify a catch-all 
provision? And what about the power conferred upon the United 
States Attorneys to "prosecute in such district all delinquents 
for crimes and offences? 1144 In light of all this, it is passing 
strange that the Supreme Court in 1812 held that there was no 
common law of crimes. 45 
The book sheds much new light on many old notions. Its 
success lies in compelling the reader to forebear from reading 
the First Judiciary Act through the eyes of "moderns." The 
reader is thus constrained to avoid the ruinous vision of 
conventional wisdom. For example, it generally has been assumed 
that the national judicial system was modeled on then-existing 
hierarchical systems of state judiciaries. This was not so, as 
the authors of the book clearly demonstrate. They show that the 
state systems were subsequently modeled on the one established by 
the Judiciary Act of 1789. At the time the Act was adopted, 
there was in most cases no distinction between trial and 
appellate judges in the several states. What then existed was a 
corps of judges who presided over trials in the field and at 
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times assembled in the state capitals to hear appeals. The same 
group of judges sat in different courts.~ Often, there was no 
real distinction between trials and appeals, and review often 
meant a retrial by a court having more judges than the original 
"inferior" court. 
Apparently, there were those who feared that the Article III 
provision for "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact" 
in the Supreme Court would require litigants to travel to the 
nation's capital for retrials. As the authors put it: "The 
opponents of the constitution, and even some of its friends, were 
alarmed by this provision, since they read it in the context of 
the then-existing state courts. 1147 Also frightening to some was 
the fact that the language of the constitution seemed to dispense 
with juries on retrial in the Supreme Court. It was to address 
those concerns that the new three-tier system was established for 
the national courts. A jury was provided where the Supreme Court 
exercised its original jurisdiction in cases brought against 
citizens of the United states. The appeals process was designed 
to work in a different way from that extant at the time, since 
writs of error were provided to bring up cases on appeal. The 
Supreme Court would be limited to questions of law where a lower 
court was to be reviewed, and questions of fact could not be 
retried in those cases. Policy reasons, rather than tradition, 
informed the new hierarchical system and the procedures 
prescribed for the national courts. 
This book, as promised, exposes myths, challenges premises 
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and uses new evidence in its examination of the Judiciary Act of 
1789. It does so in an exciting way, and the interest of the 
reader is held from start to finish. The background of the First 
Judiciary Act is presented in a most informative manner. There 
are eight chapters in the book, each of which stands alone as a 
matter of separate interest. The chapter headings are 
descriptive of the material included in each: Introduction; 
Chronology and Description; The "Judicial Systems" of the several 
States in 1789; Organization of National Courts Under the 
Judiciary Act of 1789; Word Usage in the Constitution and in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789; Criminal Jurisdiction of the National 
Courts; section 34; and Epilogue: An Outline of the History and 
Interpretation of Section 34. There are three appendices: 
Charles Warren and the Judiciary Act of 1789; The Sources for a 
History of the Judiciary Act of 1789; and Letters to and from 
Caleb Strong During May 1789. The appendices are most valuable, 
as are the Notes, Table of Short-Form Citations and Index. 
This is a book for those who have an interest in the federal 
judiciary in its past, in its present, and in its future. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
1. The National Legal Center for the Public Interest blames 
"the increased politicization of the legislative process" for the 
inaction of the 101st and 102nd Congresses, noting that 
legislation bearing on "[n]early every major issue--from campaign 
reform to unemployment insurance to employment discrimination to 
abortion to resale price maintenance to crime--found its way into 
a veto showdown that slowed and, in some cases, eliminated its 
prospects." National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 
Judicial Legislative Watch Report, Vol. XIII, No. 2 at 2 (Mar. 6, 
1992). . 
2. Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, and Using New 
Evidence 13 (1990) [hereinafter "Ritz, Rewriting the History"]. 
3. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the united 
States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) [hereinafter "Judiciary Act of 
1789 11 ]. 
4. See Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin & 
David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 30-49 (3d ed. 1988) (tracing evolution of federal 
court system) [hereinafter "Hart & Wechsler's"]: Charles A. 
Wright, The Law of Federal courts 1-8 (4th ed. 1983) 
(highlighting major events in evolution of federal judiciary) 
[hereinafter "Wright, Federal Courts"]: Roger J. Miner, Planning 
for the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: 
The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 65 st. Johns L. 
Rev. 673, 674-76 (1991) (discussing creation of modern circuit 
courts of appeals) [hereinafter "Miner, Planning for the Second 
Century"]. 
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at §§ 3, 4, 1 Stat. at 
73-75. 
6. I d. at § 4, 1 stat. at 74-75. 
7. Id. at § 2, 1 Stat. at .,., . ~. 
8. I d. at § 3, 1 Stat. at 73-74. 
9. !d. at § 4, 1 stat. at 74-75. 
10. Id. at § 9, 1 stat. at 76-77. 
11. Id. 
1 
12. .rg. at § 11, 1 Stat. at 79. 
13. zg. at § 11, 1 stat. at 78. 
14. .rg. at § 12, 1 stat. at 79-80. 
15. zg. at §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. at 83-84. 
16. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 u.s. 387, 409 (1985) (Rehnquist, 
J • I dissenting) ("In 1891 Congress extended this right to include 
'otherwise infamous' crimes.") (citation omitted). 
17. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
18. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at § 13, 1 
stat. at 80-81 with u.s. Const. art. III, § 2. 
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-
81. 
20. .IQ. at § 13, 1 Stat. at 81. Trial by jury of factual issues 
was provided for in the district and circuit courts in all except 
admiralty, maritime, and equity cases. Id. at§§ 9(d), 12, 1 
Stat. at 77, 79-80. 
21. .IQ. at § 22, 1 stat. at 84. 
22. zg. at § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86. 
23. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 4 (Apr. 2, 
1990) (offering comprehensive review of state of Judiciary and 
proposals to "prevent the system from being overwhelmed by a 
rapidly growing and already enormous caseload") [hereinafter 
"Study Committee Report"]. See generally Miner, Planning for the 
Second Century, supra note 4 (reviewing Study Committee Report, 
evaluating recommendations, and describing techniques used in 
Second Circuit for handling problems identified by Report, as 
well as offering further suggestions); Roger J. Miner, The 
Tensions of a Qual Court system and Some Prescriptions for 
Relief, 51 Alb. L. Rev. 151 (1987) (commenting on difficulty of 
having parallel judicial systems with sometimes overlapping 
jurisdiction and suggesting methods for alleviating friction). 
24. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. 
Much has been written about the potential abolition of diversity 
jurisdiction. See. e.g., Flange & Boersema, Changes in the 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Effects on State Court caseloads, 
15 U. Dayton L. Rev. 405 (1990) (detailed study of effect of 
elimination or restriction of diversity jurisdiction on state 
courts); H.c. Butler & J. Frank, Abolition of Diversity 
Jurisdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? (National Legal Center 
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for Public Interest 1983); Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts 566-
69 (2d ed. 1989). See also study Committee Report, supra note 
23, at 38-42 (recommending abolition of diversity jurisdiction, 
or in the alternative limiting its availability, and thereby 
easing federal caseload). 
25. Ritz, Rewriting the History, supra note 2, at 5. 
26. See Wright, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 4, 26-27; Hart 
& Wechsler's, supra note 4, at 37. 
27. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 u.s. 
528, 588 (1985) (O'Connor, ![., dissenting). 
28. See generally Miner, Planning for the Second Century, supra 
note 4, at 676-724 (noting burgeoning federal caseload as 
reported by Federal Courts Study Committee and discussing 
possible solutions); Roger J. Miner, Federal courts, Federal 
Crimes. an4 Federalism, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117 (1987) 
(positing "federalization" of criminal law as cause of 
overburdened federal courts). See also generally Jeffrey B. 
Morris, Federal Justice in the Second Circuit (1987) (discussing 
historical landmarks in expansion of federal jurisdiction). 
29. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at § 34. The 
comparable provision today reads: 
The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United states or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the 
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. 
28 u.s.c. § 1652. 
30. Wright, Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 5. 
31. Swift v. Tyson, 41 u.s. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
32. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 u.s. 64, 78 (1938). 
33. Id. at 72. See also Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: 
Tension in the Allocation of Judicial Power 211 n.4 (2d ed. 
1990). 
34. Ritz, Rewriting the History, supra note 2, at 132. 
35. I d. at 10-11. 
36. Ritz, Rewriting the History, supra note 2, at 148. 
37. .Ig. 
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38. Ig. at 114-15. 
39. Id. at 115. 
40. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 stat. 112, 112. 
41. u.s. const. art. I, § 8. 
42. Ritz, Rewriting the History, supra note 2, at 110. 
43. Id. at 118-20. 
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 3, at § 35, 1 stat. at 92. 
45. united states v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 u.s. (7 cranch) 32 
. (1812). 
46. Ritz, Rewriting the History, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
47. Id. at 6. 
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Stales; (3) jurisdiclion, eoncurrent with the courts of the several states and 
the circuit courts, "of all ca~ where an aliel) sUeS. for a: tort ol)ly in 
violalimi: Of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States~; ( 4) 
jurisdiction, ooDcurtent witlf the state and circuit courts, in Suits at 
comrni)n law brought. by the United States in which "th!! matter in dispute 
amounts1 exclusive of costs, . to the· sum or val!W of one hlli1llted d011ats"l 
and (5) excluSiye juri~clion of Suits against consulS' or vice-consuls, 
except fot criminal offenses triable hi the circuit courts''"' · 
The district courts were given · excluSive criminal jurisdiclion 
respecting 
crimes andoffenees that shall be cogni:l!llble under the authority 
of the United States, committed within their respeclive districts, 
4. See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART & WECHSU!R'S Tim FEDERAL 
Comrrs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3049 (:lll ed. 1988) (tJOeing the evolutioo of the 
federal court syotem); CHARLEs A. WRiG"dT, T""riELAW OF FEDERAL COURTS l-8 (4th ed. 
1983) (highlighring 1111\ior events in the evolution of the federal judiciary); RogcrJ. Miner, 
Planning for the Second Cilntury of the Second Orcult Court of Appeals: The RqJort of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, 65 ST, JoHN'S L. REV, 673, 674-76 (1991) (discussing 
the cteation of modem circuit courts of appeals). 
5. See Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 3-4, 1 Slat. at 73-75. 
6. See id. I 4, I Slat. at 74-75. 
7. See id. I 2, 1 Slat. at 73. 
8. See id. I 3, 1 Slat. at 73-74. 
9. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75. 
10. Id. § 9, I Slat. at 76-77. 
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or upon the high seas; where tw other punishment than whipping, 
oot exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred 
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is 
to be inflicted.11 
521 
The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of the same crimes 
and offenses, and exclusive jurisdiction over all others. 12 On the civil 
side, the Aet accorded to the circuit cmms' 
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the sevetal 
States, of all suits of a civil.nature at common law or iri equit)', 
where the mallei in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sun1 
or value of five hundred dollars, and the United StateS are 
plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is 
between a citizen of the State where the suit iS brought, and a 
citizen of another State. 13 
The Act provided fdt t'el)lOVal of cases from Statec.oourts to the circuit 
courts in private civil litigati(ln wlien the amolllit in dispute exceeded five 
hundred dollars a)ld the petitiUfi rorren!OVaf was filed by (1) a defendant 
who W8S' an alien; (2) a defendant stted iri. a state different from hiS .state 
of citizenship by a plairitiff wlio was a citize.n of the. State iri which the suit' 
was brought; ol' (3) by a Party claiming a grant of lane);' title from a state 
other than the forum state when the adverse part)' claimed title under a 
grant from the forum state and both parties wllre citizens of the fOrum 
state. 14 The circuit courts had appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of 
the district courts iri adnlitalt)' and maritime cases m whiCh the amount iri 
dispute exceeded three hundred dollars, and over final judgments of the 
district courts m civil cases iri which the amOIDit in dispute exceeded fifty 
dollars." There was no right of appeal from any criminal conviction iri 
the federal court system until 1889, when the right of direct review by the 
Supreme Court was provided for capital cases. 16 The First Judiciary Aet 
II. Id. 
12. See id. §II, I Stat. at 79. 
13. Id. I II, I Stat. at 78. 
14. See id. I 12, I Stat. at 79-81). 
15. See id. §§ 21, 22, I Stat. at 83-84. 
16. See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, eb. 113, 25 Stat. 656; see al.so Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387, 409 (1985) (Rebnqui.st, 1., dissenting) ("[In 1889] Congi'CIIS granted a right of din:c:t 
review in the Supreme Court in capital cases. In 18,91 Congress extended this right to 
include 'otherwise infamous' crimes.") (citations omitted). 
I 
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also failed to confer general f~ral question jurisdiction upon the lower 
courts., a deficiency 1hat was not finally renredied untill875!' ·· 
Congress conferred up;m the Supremt~ Coort,. in langilage tracldng the 
Constitution," (1) ex<;lusive j~ction ovet civil controver!lies W. which 
a state was a party, except suits between a state and its ci~ns; (2) 
origw.al and exclusive jurisdiction in SJJits ag;rinst ambassadors or other 
pl.lblic ministe~• cousistent with the law of nations;. !\lid. (3) original but 
not exclusive juri~ction of all suits brought by iU'llbassadors or othet 
public ministers. 19 Original but not exclusive jurisdiction was provided 
in actio~$ b!ltween a Slate and .ci~IIS of other states or aliens."' 
ManifeWJ!g the ill)pOitap.ce of jUry trial!! fA~ .o\mericap citizel)rJ, the 
Act pr1Jlii~'L1hat "the tcia1 qf issues in fact it:l the Supreme Couri, in all 
actions .at law ag;rinst citizens of the United States, sball be by jury,"21 
Final:. judgmefil!l and decrees of the eitcoit COI!tts in Ch1il (:llses Were 
appealablt\ tt)· the Supreme Coqrt on writs of error when the )llllttet in 
dispu.te. exceeded, two· thOliSllll!l dollllrs in. value. 22 Revit~W of a final 
judgment of lhe hi~t COUrt. Qf a sta~ was allowed wll!ln the . qUeStion 
involved the validity 0f a trtlaty; a ~tatute of the United States or an 
authority elCer~ under the Unite<l States."' · . . · .. · . . 
The Jwficiary J\Ct of 178.9 i§ more than jllSt an. object of historical 
inter~. It i$ an important IIOWl of reference fot tho$e whO are concerned 
with. the W:*~Y opetatiQII. of' the federal coon system and· who Cllre 
about its· fu.tw.'~ At 1!: lime ~n stwctural tefwm of the system ls. UJI.der 
serious consideratiQJI.,~ the institu!iQJI.al. antecedeP.ts of the existing 
17. Fed!:ral quelitiOnjuriadietioi) ~ C()nf~ uJ>on.the district courts by the Judicia!r 
Act: of Manili ~,1875, <h; 137, I~ ~: 47Q. . .. 
18. ~Judie~ Act: of 1789, ~ 13, !.Stat. at 8"'81 wilh U.S. CONST. art. m, 
p. 
' 
19. ~ee 1udicialy Act: of i789, § 13, I Stat. at. B"L 
20, See id. § 13, 1 Slat. at 80. 
21. ld. § 13, I Stat. at 81. Trial by jury of facluaJ itiauoB wu provided for in the 
district and eU.:uit courts.in all except admiralty, maritime, and equity cases. See id. §§ 
9(d), 12, 1 Stat at 77, 80. 
22. See id. §22, I Stat, at 84. 
23. See id. § 25, I Stat. at 85-86. 
24, See generally FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPoRT OF 1liB FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY CoMMITI'IlE 4 (1990) (offering a compn:hensive n:view of state of the 
1udiciaey and propoaals to "prevent the syatem from being overwhelmed by a rapidly 
growing and aheody coormous caseload"); Miner, supra note 4 (reviewing the Study 
Committee Report, evaluating its teCommeudations, describing how the Secoud Circuit 
currently handles the problems identified in the report, and offering further suggestions); 
Roger 1. Miner, 1M Ten.rlmu of a Dual Court Sysiem and Some Prescriptions for ReUif, 
51 AlB. L. REv. 151 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of having panillelstatc and federal 
I 
1 
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structure are worthy of examination. Also of intere$t to those who would 
prepare for the future of 1he federal courts is the ()riginal treatment of 
subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity .iurilidiction."' It should be 
remembered that 1he Judiciary Act of 1789 did not vest in the federal 
courts the full judicial powel' provided by the Constitution, probably 
because the FederalistS in eontrol of Congress souglit to appease the Anti-
Federalists. 26 Indeed, Qmgress never liaS' COnferred upon the courts the 
full constitutional judicial power it bas ~n authorized w confer .73 
Should it do so now, in response to populai 'defuarid? or should it cut 
back? Should the status q11o be lilalntained? The answers to these 
qUestions, and others, can be gathered by studying the original Judiciary 
Act One thing is certain: the ever-expluidiD.g menu provided in the lower 
federal courts, 28 a consequence , of the • "underdevelo~ capacity [of 
Congress] for self-restralntn29 is be~ to cr~te, a caseldlKI crisis of 
major proportions. 311 . . . . . , ·.. , . . ·• · 
Twentieth"Century scholars, lawyers; andjudges hllv!lllad occasion w 
refer to section 34 of the original Judiciary Act and, apparently, will bave 
reason to d~t so again. In section 34, Congress went beyond the SttiJetUrali 
jurisdictional, and ptoeedilral aspects of the newly created judici;U systenr 
\'- > 
judicial syiltOms witb !IOrlletimeil: overlapping juriBdietio!t . and auggi:stihg m.thdcllt for 
allevialing friction between the two systems) .. 
25. St!e Judiciary Act of 1789, § ll; I Stat. at 78. ~uch has~ written about the 
potential aboliliuo of diversily jurisdiction. See, e.g., ~. CAlDWEll lltJTI.ER & Iol!N P.' 
FRANK, Alloll110N OF DIVER,m'Y ]URISJ¥CTION: AN IDEA WHOSB"J)MJ! HAs COMB'/ <Nat'! 
Legal Ctr;. for the Pub. Interest 1u4icW ~. 1983) (pxeaenting 1irgument11 both iJj iiUPJ>oit 
of and against a1tendion of diveniJ¥ jurisdiction);. FEDERAL. Coulrrs $1m~Y co~, "!P,. 
note 24, at 3842 (n:conunendiljg citl>cr aboliahiilg diveniJ¥ jurisdiCtion or lilnlting its 
availability, to ease the fc®ml caseload); MAimN H. REDISH, FEDERAL CO!JJm!: CAsES, 
COMMENTS AND QIJBSTIONS 566-69 (2d cd. 1989) (notiljg varioua ~ for federiol. 
diversity jurisdiction and discutsing alternatives thm:to); VICtor E. i'Jan8" & C,.jg 
Boenema, Charigei in Federal Diverrity Jurisdictidn: E;jfects 011 State COurt CtUefOaiJJ, IS 
U. DAYTON L. Rlrv. 405 (1990) (discuBSUjg the effect on -., c:Ourta of elimination or 
n:strictiuo of fc®m! diveniJ¥ jurisdiction). 
26. RITz, supra note 2, at 5. 
27. BATOR ET AL, supra note 4, at 37; WBIGHT, supra note 4, at 4. 
28. St!e genen>lly .IEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL 1l1S11CEIN THE SECOND CIRCtllT 167 
(1981) (diacussing historicallanclmarlcs in the expansion of fcderiol juriBdiction). 
29. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) 
(O'Cuooor, 1., disacnting). 
30. See generally Miner, supra note 4, at 676-724 (notiljg the bo~ fcdcriol. 
caseload and discu08ing pollllible aolutiollll); Roger 1. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal 
Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. I.L. & P!lB. PoL'Y 117 (1981) (suggcating tllll1 the 
"federalization" of criminal law has contributed to the overburdening of fc®ml courts). 
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and ventured into the area of the law to be applied by the federal courts. 
Section 34, wbicb bas survived in the statures essentially in its original 
form, provided " [ t]hat the laws of the several stales, except where the 
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United. Stales shall otherwise require 
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law 
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. "31 It bas 
been said that "[p]robably no statule regarding the federal courts bas led 
to sucb difficulty" as this one. 32 
According to present conve.ntional wisdom, section 34 requires that 
stale law, whether statutory or COJIIIIlOn, must be applied except in matlers 
governed by the FedenU Constitution, acts of Congress or treaties dul~ 
ratified. This notion of course gained currency. when Swift v. Tyson, 
inlerpre)ing "laws" in the conlext of section 34 as statutory only,34 was 
overruled by Erie RailrOl!d v.. Tompkins. 35 On behalf of the Erie 
majority, Justice Brandeis wrole that "whether the law of the Stale shall 
be declared by its Legislature in a sta.tule or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matler of federal concern. "36 The Brandeis opininn was 
based in part on what the JustiQe re~rred to as. "recent research of a 
compelent $cboJar.•37., The scholar was Pro~ssor Charles Warren, who 
had found in the attic of the Senale what appeared to be the original 
manuscript draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In the draft that Professor 
Warren found, there was a provision that would have established as rules 
of decision at common law in courts of the Uniled Stales, "the Stature law 
of the several States . in force for the time being and their unwritlen or 
common law now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of 
England, the ancient statutes of the satue or otherwise. excest when the 
Federal Constitution, federal statures or treaties applied. Professor 
Warren thought that the final version of section 34 was inlended to say the 
31. JudiciaJy Aot of 1789, § 34, I Sblt. at 92. The comparable provision today Ieads: 
"The laws of thO scveml otab:a, except where the Constitution or treatieo of the United 
States or Acts of Congreu otherwise require or provide, &hall be regarded as rulet of 
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in casea where they apply." 28 
u.s.c. § 1652 (1988). 
32. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 5. 
33. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842). 
34. See id. at 17-18. 
35. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
36. Jd. at 78. 
37. Jd. at 72. But cf. MAimN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN 1111! 
AILOCA110N OF JUDICIAL POwER 211 n.4 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that Justioe Bnmdeis did 
not exclusively rely on Professor Warren's worl<). 
38. Rrrl, supra ncte 2, at 132 (quoting JudiciaJy Act of 1789, § 34 (original 
manuscript draft)). 
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same thing as the newly discovered draft. 30 He believed that section 34 
was grounded in federalism concerns. 40 
In their fascinating examination of the First Judiciary Act, the author 
and editors of Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789 put an 
entirely new spin on section 34. They say that it is not about federalism 
at all, admonishing the reader that "one ought not read Section 34 as 
doing what to moderns it seems perfectly obvious that it does and should 
do, that is, to instruct national judges to look at state statutes and state 
decisions and follow their lead. "41 They note that at the time the 
Judiciary Act was adopted there were no common law decisions in print 
and the state statutes generally were not collected and printed. 42 It 
therefore would make no sense for section 34 to refer to these as sources 
of law. 43 Moreover, they make a persussive argument that the manuscript 
discovered by Professor Warren was not the same version of the bill that 
the Senate used during its deliberations. 44 The Warren view is said to be 
flawed by reliance on the manuscript. 45 
Through scholarly deduction, examination of ancient documents, legal 
reasoning, attention to the language then in use, and an astute 
understanding of the tenor of the times, the distinguished legal historians 
who wrote this book have posited tw<i alternative conclusions about section 
34: that it was intended as a direction to the new courts to apply American 
rather than British law in all common law civil and criminal 
proceedings;46 or "most probably [that it] was intended as a temporary 
measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal 
prosecutions, should national criminal prosecutions be brought in the 
national courts, pending the time that Congress would _provide by statute 
for the definition and punishment of national crimes. "4 They are certain 
that section 34 was rwt intended to apply to diversity cases and that "on 
its historical basis, Erie is dead wrong. "48 
Rewriting the History makes a forceful argument for the proposition 
that section 34 was designed to allow the national courts to apply 
American, rather than British, criminal common law until a national 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 25. 
41. Id. at 10-11. 
42. See id. at 10. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 12640. 
45. See id. at 137. 
46. See id. 
47. Id. at 148. 
48. Id. 
I 
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criminal code could be adopted. 49 In its . first session, the first Congress 
fulled to pass a criminal bill, although it did define two crimes with 
punishment, both conlained in the Collection Act and relating to the 
collection of duties, and one crime with no specified penal~ contained in 
the Coasting Act and relating to the registering of ships. The Crimes 
Act of 1790,51 adopted in the second session of the first Congress, was 
the earliest criminal code. It defined crimes and provided penalties for 
four categories of prohibited activities within the exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction of the United States: felonies committed on the high seas, 
offenses directly affecting the operations of government, crimes committed 
within federal enclaves, and interference with the functioning of federal 
courts. 52 The offenses sanctioned in the Crimes Act were either 
mentioned specifically in the Constitution or established under the 
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause."' 
At least between the first and second sessions of the first Congress, 
then, there was no criminal code in effect. Even the Crimes Act of 1790 
can bardly be characterized as a comprehensive criminal code. What 
criminal law was to apply? It generally was assumed that some law of 
crimes was to be applied, else why grant to the lower federal courts such 
complete criminal jurisdiction? Even the Anti-Federalists arguing for a Bill 
of Rights that included guarantees relating to the criminal process 
"premised their argument on the assumption that the national courts onder 
the Constitution did bave a comprehensive criminal jurisdiction.""' 
Another historical curiosity supporting this contention is that the first 
federal judges, in giving their grand jury charges, seem to bave accepted 
the extension of criminal jurisdiction to nonstatutory crimes." Curious 
also is the position of section 34 in the First Judiciary Act. It is the next-
to-last section, just before the provision for United States Attorneys in 
each district and for an Attorney General of the United States. Does this 
position signify a catch-all provision? And wbat about the power conferred 
upon the United States Attorneys to "prosecute in such district all 
delinquents for crimes and offences"?'" In light of all this, it is passing 
49. See id. at 116. 
so. !d. !It 1!4-15. 
51. Ch. 9, I Stat. 112. 
52. See id. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
54. RITZ, supra note 2, at 110. 
55. See id. at 118-20. 
56. Judiciluy M of 1789, § 35, I Stat. at 92. 
I j 
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strange lhat the Supreme Court in 1812 held lhat there was no comnion 
law of crimes. 57 
Rewriting the History sheds much new light ol1 many old notions. Its 
success lies ill compelling the reader to forebear from readillg the First 
Judiciary Act through the eyes of "moderns." The reader is thus 
constrailled to avoid the ruinous ·vision of conventional 'wisd0111. For 
example, it generally has been assumed lhat the national judicial system 
was modeled on then-existing hierarchical systems of state judiciaries. 
This was not so, as the author and editots of the book cleatly demOnstrate. 
They show lhat the state syste111S were subseqUently modeled o11 the one 
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.58 At the til1le the Act was 
adopted, there was ill most cases no distinction between trial and appellate 
judges in the several states. What thel1 existed was a corps of judges who 
presided over trials ill the field aDd at tinies assembled ill the state capitals 
to hear . appeals.,. The same group of judges sat ill differellt COUrts. 
Often, there was no real distinction between trials and apPeals, and review 
often nieant a retrial by a court having: more judges 1han the origil1al 
"iofetior" court"" 
Apparently, there were those who {eared lhatthe Article ill pt0Visiol1 
for "appellate jilrisdiction; both as to law aDd fa:ct" in the Supreme Court. 
would require litigants td travel to the 11ation's . chpilal fOr retrialS.~' As 
Ritz, Holt, and LaRue put it: "The opponents of the Constitution, and 
even some of its friends, were alarmed by this provision, since they read 
it in the context of the then-existing state courts. "62 . Also frightening to 
some was the fact lhat the language of the Constitution seemed to dispense 
with jories on retrial in the Supreme Court. It was to address those 
concerns lhat Congress established the new three-tier system for the 
national COUrts. 63 A jury was provided when the Supreme Court 
exercised its original jilrisdiction in cases brought against citizens of the 
United States.64 The appeals process was designed to work ill a different 
way from that extant at the time, because writs of error were prOVided to 
bring up cases on appeal. The Supreme Court was limited to qUestions of 
law when a lower court's decision was being reviewed; questions of fact 
57. Ike United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cnuteh) 32, 34 (1812). 
58. See RITz, supra note 2, at 5. 
59. ld. at 5-6. 
60. ld. 
61. ld. at 6. 
62. ld. 
63. ld. at 7. 
64. See Judiciluy Act of 1789, § 13, I Stat. at 8().81. 
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could not be retried in those cases. 65 Policy reasons, rather than 
tradition, informed the new hierarchical system and the procedures 
prescribed for the national courts • .., 
This book, as promised, exposes myths, chal1enges pre~, and uses 
new evidence in its examination of the JuQiciary Act of 1789, It does so 
in an exciting ~y, holding the reader's interest from start to finish. The 
background of the Fi~ Jmliciary Act is presented in a most informative 
manner. There are eight chapters in the book, each of which stands alone 
. as a matter of separate interest. The chapter headings are descriptive of 
the materilll inc!Qded in each: lntl'od~ction; Chronology and Description; 
The ."Jndicial ~terns" of th~. S~veral Sllite$ in 1789; Organization of 
NatioJll!), GQIU'ts V.J!det the Judiciltey A-ct of 1789; Word Usa~ in the 
Constitution and in the)uQiqiltey Act of 1789; CritllinaJ. J~sdiction, Qf the 
National CQIU'ts; Section 34; and Epilogge: M OUtiine of the Histrity and 
Interprellition of S~oll 34,, There 11re lhtee 11ppel)ljices: Chl!rles Warren 
and the Jll!liciary Act of 1189; The Sowces for a. l:listory of the Jndiciary 
Act of 1789; and; Letters to and from Caleb Stl'ong D~ May 1789. The 
appendices are most valuable, as are the Notes, the Table of Short-Form 
Citations, and the Ind;¢:x, 
This is a. book for· aU those who have an interest in the federal 
jndiciary-in its past,, in its present, and in its future. 
65. See id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84-85. 
66. See RITZ, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
